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Abstract
In this paper, we suggest that cortical anatomy recapitulates the temporal hierarchy that is inherent in the dynamics of
environmental states. Many aspects of brain function can be understood in terms of a hierarchy of temporal scales at which
representations of the environment evolve. The lowest level of this hierarchy corresponds to fast fluctuations associated
with sensory processing, whereas the highest levels encode slow contextual changes in the environment, under which
faster representations unfold. First, we describe a mathematical model that exploits the temporal structure of fast sensory
input to track the slower trajectories of their underlying causes. This model of sensory encoding or perceptual inference
establishes a proof of concept that slowly changing neuronal states can encode the paths or trajectories of faster sensory
states. We then review empirical evidence that suggests that a temporal hierarchy is recapitulated in the macroscopic
organization of the cortex. This anatomic-temporal hierarchy provides a comprehensive framework for understanding
cortical function: the specific time-scale that engages a cortical area can be inferred by its location along a rostro-caudal
gradient, which reflects the anatomical distance from primary sensory areas. This is most evident in the prefrontal cortex,
where complex functions can be explained as operations on representations of the environment that change slowly. The
framework provides predictions about, and principled constraints on, cortical structure–function relationships, which can be
tested by manipulating the time-scales of sensory input.
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Introduction
Our brains navigate our bodies, including our sensory apparatus,
through a dynamically changing environment. This is a remarkable
achievement, because a specific behaviour might be optimal in the
short-term, but suboptimal over longer time periods. It is even more
remarkable that the brain selects among different behaviours quickly
and online. Causal dynamics and structure in the environment are
critical for selecting behaviour, because the brain can learn this
structure to predict the future, and exploit these predictions to
negotiate the environment adaptively. Ontogenetically, there is good
reason to believe that the brain learns regularities in the environment
from exposure to sensory input and internally generated signals [1,2].
Similarly, over evolutionary time, one can argue that selective
pressure ensures the brain has the capacity to represent environ-
mental structure [3–5]. In the following, we will first review the ‘free-
energy principle’ [6], which suggests that ‘adaptive agents’ like the
brain, in a dynamic environment, minimize their surprise about
sensory input. We will then motivate the hypothesis that the
environment exhibits temporal structure, which is exploited by the
brain to optimise its predictions. This optimisation transcribes
temporal structure in the environment into anatomical structure,
lending the brain a generic form of structure-function mapping.
For an adaptive agent, surprise means sampling unexpected input
given the expectations of the agent. Mathematically, surprise or
improbability is quantified by 2ln p(y(a)|m), where y(a) is sensory
input sampled under action a and m represents the agent.
Minimizing surprise depends on the agent’s expectations about its
sensory input and the behaviour it chooses. If these expectations
(e.g., being warm but not on fire) are consistent with survival, an
agent, which minimizes free-energy, will exhibit behaviour that is
adapted to its environment. If an agent did not minimize surprise, it
would sooner or later encounter surprising interactions with the
environment, which may compromise its structural or physiological
integrity (e.g., walking into a fire). Both action and perception can
be understood as trying to minimize surprise about sensory input.
An agent cannot minimize surprise directly because the agent does
not have full knowledge about its environment [6]. However, an
agent can minimize its so-called free-energy F$2ln p(y(a)|m), which
is an upper bound on surprise: if an agent minimises its free-energy,
it implicitly minimises surprising sensory input.
To predict extero- and interoceptive input online, an agent must
entertain dynamic expectations about its input using an internal
model of environmental causes and their trajectories. These models
reduce high-dimensional input to a few variables or ‘causes’ in the
environment. These environmental causes do not need to be
physical objects but can be any quantity that predicts the agent’s
past and future sensory input (we use prediction here in reference to
the mapping between causes and their sensory consequences; this
mapping subsumes but is more than a forecast of future events).
Critically, from the point of view of an agent, its body is a part of the
environment. Therefore, internal models embed an agent’s
knowledge about how environmental dynamics, including its own
movements, generate sensory input [6]. The concept of ‘internal
models’ which predict future sensory input due to the agent’s own
action is a key element of many related theoretical accounts: for
example, the ‘corollary discharge hypothesis’ [7], predictive coding
[8,9], and motor control theory [10,11].
In general, the sensory consequences of environmental causes
are mediated by dynamical systems. This necessarily induces
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delays in the mapping between causes and their sensory consequenc-
es. How can an agent accommodate this temporal dislocation to
explain causes after they are expressed in the sensorium [12,13]? In
this paper, we suggest that agents model sensory input using
representations or ‘concepts’ that provide temporally stable predic-
tions about future sensory input. In this paper we will use ‘concept’ to
refer to a representation of an environmental cause or state that
endures for about a second or more and ‘percept’ for representations
that more transient. In terms of dynamical systems, concepts could be
regarded as control parameters that shape the attractor or manifold
on which lower-level representations unfold. This attractor provides
constraints on the expected trajectories, which enable fast dynamics
to be predicted by supraordinate representations that change more
slowly (see Results). This rests on the assumption that the world can
be modelled as a hierarchy of autonomous dynamical systems, where
the output of one system controls the motion of another’s states. In
principle, an agent may be able to model the evolution of
environmental states over milliseconds, seconds, or much longer
periods of time using generative or forward models at various time-
scales. For example, speech could be decomposed at various time-
scales (from fast to slow): instantaneous frequency (acoustics); spectral
profiles (phonemes); phoneme sequences (lexical); lexical sequences
(semantics); syntactical structure (pragmatics), and so on [14].
Predictions about sensory input at fast time-scales become
imprecise when projected too far into the future. One way to deal
with this uncertainty is to use concepts to guide representations at
shorter time-scales. If predictions of sensory input remain veridical at
a fast time-scale and action ensures these predictions are fulfilled, the
agent will avoid surprising input. The ensuing behaviour would be
consistent with the agent’s concepts. Note that an agent following this
principle can still handle novel, unexpected input, although the agent
might experience a large prediction error and adapt its internal model
accordingly (see simulations). If the high-level representations or
concepts prove correct in predicting sensory input, they confirm the
validity of those concepts. Therefore, concepts can be seen as self-
fulfilling prophecies, which, given a compliant environment, would
appear to mediate goals, plans and long-term strategies for exchange
with the world [15]. Conflict among competing explanations (i.e.,
concepts) for sensory data has to be resolved to avoid surprise. This
conflict can be between similar time-scales; e.g. between the visual
and auditory stream when experiencing the McGurk effect [16].
Conflict could also exist between different time-scales; e.g., between
eating a chocolate cake or maintaining a strict diet. In robotics and
motor control theory, conflict resolution among different time-scales
has been addressed using hierarchical control structures [17–22].
These hierarchies are ordered according to the temporal scales of
representations, where the slowest time-scale is at the top (c.f., ‘slow
feature analysis’ [23,24]). A hierarchical model enables a selection of
predictions that is accountable to all time-scales, such that concepts
and percepts are nested and internally consistent.
The novel contribution of this paper is to consider hierarchical
models, in which high-level states change more slowly than low-
level states, and to relate these models to structure-function
relationships in the brain. The basic idea is that temporal
hierarchies in the environment are transcribed into anatomical
hierarchies in the brain; high-level cortical areas encode slowly
changing contextual states of the world, while low-level areas
encode fast trajectories. We will present two arguments in support
of this hypothesis. First, using simulations, we will demonstrate
that hierarchical dependencies among dynamics in the environ-
ment can be exploited to recognise the causes of sensory input.
The ensuing recognition models have a hierarchical structure that
is reminiscent of cortical hierarchies in the brain. Second, we will
consider neuroscientific evidence that suggests the cortical
organisation recapitulates hierarchical dependencies among envi-
ronmental dynamics.
Note that this paper is not about hierarchies of neuronal
dynamics; see e.g. [25–27]. Rather, we consider neuronal
dynamics under hierarchical models of the environment, which,
according to the principles outline above, should be represented in
the brain to predict sensory input.
Methods
In this section, we present a modelling approach to show, as a
proof-of-principle, that perception can be understood in terms of
inverting hierarchical models and that these models entail a
separation of temporal scales.
A Model of Perceptual Inference
Here, we model the neuronal states of an internal model in an
abstract fashion, to describe their evolution under continuous
sensory input. This allows us to focus on how the brain could
exploit dependencies between dynamics at different time-scales,
using internal models.
We pursue the notion that synthetic agents can extract
information about another agent, at various time-scales, by
modelling the sensory input, originating from the other agent, with
an internal, generative model. We will describe how an agent
produces a song and how another agent decodes the auditory input.
We will deal with environmental dynamics at two different time-
scales (fast and slow). In our model, we let the dynamics at the slow-
scale enter as ‘control’ parameters of dynamics at the fast scale.
Our example uses birdsong: There is a large body of theoretical
and experimental evidence that birdsongs are generated by
dynamic, nonlinear and hierarchical systems [28–31]. Birdsong
contains information that other birds use for decoding information
about the singing (usually male) bird. It is unclear which features
birds use to extract this information; however, whatever these
features are, they are embedded in the song, at different time-scales.
For example, at a long time-scale, another bird might simply
measure how long a bird has been singing, which might belie the
bird’s fitness. At short time-scales, the amplitude and frequency
spectrum of the song might reflect the bird’s strength and size.
It may be that the recognition of human song or speech is
implemented using hierarchical structures too; although the
experimental evidence for this seems much scarcer. In particular,
speech has been construed as the output of a multi-level hierarchical
system, which must be decoded at different time-scales [32,33]. For
example, while a spoken sentence might only last for seconds, it also
conveys information about the speaker’s intent (an important
environmental cause) at much longer time-scales. Here we use the
Author Summary
Currently, there is no theory that explains how the large-
scale organization of the human brain can be related to
our environment. This is astonishing because neuroscien-
tists generally assume that the brain represents events in
our environment by decoding sensory input. Here, we
propose that the brain models the entire environment as a
collection of hierarchical, dynamical systems, where slower
environmental changes provide the context for faster
changes. We suggest that there is a simple mapping
between this temporal hierarchy and the anatomical
hierarchy of the brain. Our theory provides a framework
for explaining a wide range of neuroscientific findings by a
single principle.
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avian example to provide a proof-of-principle of a commonplace
and generic mechanism: to communicate via audition, both birds
and humans need to embed information, at various time-scales, into
sound-waves at a fast time-scale and the recipient must invert a
dynamic model to recover this information. Our objective is to show
that such communication can be implemented using hierarchical
models with separation of temporal scales. In the following, we
describe a two-level system that can generate sonograms of synthetic
birdsong and model the perception of this song. Similar systems,
using a single generating oscillator, have been proposed to generate
birdsong [34]. What we want to show is how another (synthetic) bird
can use a heard song to extract information about the (synthetic)
singing bird, using at least two separable temporal scales.
A Generative Birdsong Model
Recently, Laje et al. [34] generated synthetic birdsong by
modelling the bird’s vocal organ using a variant of the van der Pol
oscillator. Furthermore, Laje and Mindlin [35] introduced variations
in their bird-song generator by adding a second level, which acts as a
central pattern generator (CPG) driving the van der Pol oscillator.
This hierarchical, two-level model can produce different songs,
depending on the driving input and parameters of the CPG. In our
model, we use this principle of letting a slow CPG drive a faster
system that produces song syllables. However, for simplicity, when
decoding the produced song, we model the sonogram; i.e. the time-
frequency representation of birdsong, instead of the acoustic time-
series. Although this renders our model phenomenological with
respect to dynamics in the vocal organ, it allows us to focus on the
interaction between the first-level (vocal organ) and the second-level
(central pattern generator). It would be straightforward (but
computationally expensive) to make the first level a generative model
and decode the temporally resolved time-series.
To generate birdsong sonograms, we use the Lorenz attractor,
for both levels.
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where, in general, v(i) represent inputs to level i (or outputs from
level i+1), which perturb the possibly autonomous dynamics
among that level’s states x(i). The nonlinear function f encodes the
equations of motion of the Lorenz attractor:
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For both levels, we used a=10 (the Prandtl number) and c=8/
3. The parameter T controls the speed at which the Lorenz
attractor evolves; here we used T(1) = 0.25s and T(2) = 2s so that
the dynamics at the second level are an order of magnitude
slower than at the first. At the second-level we used a Rayleigh
number; n(2) = 32. We coupled the fast to the slow system by
making the output of the slow system n 1ð Þ~x 2ð Þ3 {4 the Rayleigh
number of the fast. The Rayleigh number is effectively a control
parameter that determines whether the autonomous dynamics
supported by the attractor are fixed point, quasi-periodic or
chaotic (the famous butterfly shaped attractor). The signals
generated are denoted by y, which comprises the second and
third state of x(1) (Equation 1).
We will call the vectors x(i) ‘hidden’ states, and the scalar v(1) the
‘causal’ state, where superscripts indicate model level and
subscripts refer to elements. At each level we modelled Gaussian
noise on the causes and states (w(i) and z(i)) with a log-precision
(inverse variance), of eight (except for observation noise z(1), which
was unity). We constructed the sonogram (describing the
amplitude and frequency of the birdsong) by making |y1| the
amplitude and y2 the frequency (scaled to cover a spectrum
between two and five kHz). Acoustic time-series (which can be
played) are constructed by an inverse windowed Fourier
transform. An example of the system’s dynamics and the ensuing
sonogram are shown in Figure 1A and 1B. The software
producing these dynamics, the sonogram and playing the song
can be downloaded as Matlab 7.4 (Mathworks) code (see software
note). The synthetic birdsong passes as birdsong-like. This model
can be regarded as a generative or forward model that maps states
of the singing bird to sensory consequences (i.e., the sonogram).
Inversion of this forward model corresponds to perception or
mapping from the sonogram to the underlying cause in the singing
bird. In this example, recognition involves the online estimation of
the states at both levels. Although two of the states (those
controlling amplitude and frequency of the acoustic input) at the
first-level are accessed easily, the third x
1ð Þ
1 is completely hidden. It
is important to estimate this state correctly because it determines
the dynamics of the others (see Equation 2). Model inversion also
allows the listening bird to recognise the slowly varying states at
the second level, x(2) (c.f., the syntax of the chirps), which cannot be
heard directly but must be inferred from the fast sensory input.
This inversion problem is difficult to solve because the bird can
only infer states at both levels through the nonlinear dynamics of
the Lorenz attractor. In the following, we will sketch a variational
scheme to show how inversion of a stochastic nonlinear
hierarchical model can be implemented. A detailed description
of this inversion is beyond the scope of this paper. However, the
details and conceptual background of the approach can be found
in [36].
Variational Inversion
Given some sensory data y, the general inference problem is to
compute the marginal likelihood of the data, given a model m of
the environment:
p y mjð Þ~
ð
p y,u mjð Þdu ð3Þ
where the generative model p(y,u|m) = p(y|u,m)p(u|m) is defined in
terms of a likelihood p(y|u,m) and prior p(u|m) on the model’s
states. In Equation 3, the states u={x,v} subsume the hidden and
causal states at all levels. The model evidence can be estimated by
converting this difficult integration problem (Equation 3) into an
easier optimization problem by optimising a free-energy bound on
the log-evidence [37]. This bound is constructed using Jensen’s
Hierarchy of Time-Scales
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inequality and is a function of an arbitrary ensemble density, q(u):
F q,yð Þ~{ln p y mjð ÞzD~U{S
D~
ð
q uð Þln q uð Þ
p u y,mjð Þ du
ð4Þ
The free-energy comprises an energy term U=2Æln p(y|u)+ln
p(u)æq and an entropy term S=2Æln q(u)æq. It is defined uniquely,
given the generative model m and is an upper bound on the
surprise or negative log-evidence because the Kullback–Leibler
cross-entropy or divergence D, between the ensemble and exact
conditional density, is always positive. Minimising the free-energy
minimises the divergence, rendering the ensemble density
q(u)<p(u|y,m) an approximate posterior or conditional density.
When using this approach for model inversion, one usually
employs fixed-form approximations of the conditional, which takes
a simpler parameterized form q(u|l) [36]. Variational learning
optimizes the free-energy with respect to the variational param-
eters l; i.e., the sufficient statistics of the approximate conditional:
_l~{
L
Ll
F l,yð Þ ð5Þ
Generally, the variables l correspond to the conditional
moments (e.g., expectation and variance) of the states. A
recognition system that minimizes its free-energy efficiently will
therefore come to represent the environmental dynamics in terms
of moments of the conditional density, e.g., the conditional
expectations and variances of q(u|l) =N(m,S): l={m,S}. We
assume that the conditional moments are encoded by neuronal
activity, i.e., Equation 5 prescribes neuronal dynamics. These
dynamics implement Bayesian inversion of the generative model,
under the variational approximations entailed by the form of the
ensemble density. In practice, Equation 5 is implemented using a
message passing scheme, which, in the context of hierarchical
models, involves passing prediction errors from one level up to the
next and passing predictions down, from one level to the next. The
prediction errors are simply the difference between the causal
states at any level and their prediction from the level above,
evaluated at the conditional expectations [6,8]. This means that
we have two sets of neuronal populations, one encoding the
conditional expectations of states of the world and another
encoding prediction error. The dynamics of the first are given by
Equation 5, which can be formulated as a simple function of
prediction error; e(i) = v(i)2g(x(i+1),v(i+1),T(i+1)), which is the activity of
the second population. See [6,8] and [36] for details.
Here, Equations 1 and 2 specify the generative model in terms
of the likelihood function p(y|u,m), which follows from Gaussian
assumptions about the random terms. The hierarchical form of the
model induces empirical ‘structural’ priors, which provides top-
down constraints on the evolution of states generating sensory
Figure 1. Data and states, over two seconds, generated by a two-level birdsong model. (A) At the first level, there are two outputs (i.e.,
data) (left: blue and green solid line) and three hidden states of a Lorenz attractor (right: blue, green, and red solid line). The second level is also a
Lorenz attractor that evolves at a time-scale that is one magnitude slower than the first. At the second level, the causal state (left: blue solid line)
serves as control parameter (Rayleigh number) of the first-level attractor, and is governed by the hidden states at the second level (right: blue, green,
and red solid line). The red dotted lines (top left) indicate the observation error on the output. (B) Sonogram (time-frequency representation)
constructed from model output. High intensities represent time-frequency locations with greater power.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000209.g001
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data. In addition to these structural priors, there are also empirical
priors on the temporal evolution of the states that derive from
modelling states in generalised coordinates of motion:
Generalised Coordinates of Motion
Under the free-energy principle, the agent must implement
models that represent, at each moment in time, the dynamics of
causes in the environment, as in Equations 1 and 2. Because these
equations also prescribe how the motions of various states couple
to each other, our generative model covers not just the states but
their motion, acceleration, and higher order velocities. These are
referred to collectively as ‘generalised coordinates of motion’, in
the sense that the trajectory (or motion) of any dynamical system
can be described within this frame of reference. We use the
following notation for a vector of generalized coordinates:
u˜={u,u9,u0,u-…}, whose entries are the current state u
(Equation 3), its motion and higher order temporal derivatives.
This frame of reference can be thought of encoding the trajectory
at any instant, in terms of the coefficients of the polynomial
expansion in time:
u tzDtð Þ~u tð Þzu’ tð ÞDtz1=2u’’ tð ÞDt2z1=6u’’’ tð ÞDt3z . . . , ð6Þ
where Dt is an arbitrary time interval. Equation 6 is the Taylor
series of the trajectory as a function of time. Therefore, specifying
the generalized coordinates of motion at any time point encodes
the present, past and future states of the system [38]. This
representation is related to the notion of ‘spatiotemporal receptive
fields’ that describe the response of neurons to certain spatiotem-
poral dynamics in the environment [39], see also [40]. The
sufficient statistics l (Equation 5) of the conditional generalized
motion q(u˜|l) encodes trajectories in a probabilistic fashion.
Uncertainty on each generalised coordinate controls how far into
the future the trajectory can be specified with confidence (for
example, to represent a smooth trajectory that extends far into the
future, one needs high precision on high-order derivatives). In
other words, from the agent’s perspective, the precision of both its
memory and its prediction of sensory input will fall with distance
from the current time as a function of the conditional precision of
its state in generalized coordinates. The empirical priors that
obtain from modelling in generalised coordinates ensure smooth
continuous estimates of trajectories and enable online inversion.
For more details please see [36].
In our simulations, we used six high-order temporal derivatives
for the hidden states x(1) and x(2), and two for the causal state v(1). It
should be noted that although generalised coordinates finesse the
recognition dynamics prescribed by Equation 5, the focus of this
work is on the empirical priors that are conferred by the
hierarchical structure of the model. It is these that enable the
separation of temporal scales and prediction over long time-scales.
The routines (incl. Matlab source code) implementing this
dynamic inversion and the birdsong example are available as
academic freeware (Statistical Parametric Mapping package
(SPM8) from http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/; Dynamic Ex-
pectation Maximization (DEM) Toolbox).
Results
Simulations of Birdsong Perception
In this section, we generate synthetic birdsong using the coupled
Lorenz oscillators described above and model a ‘listening’ bird
during song recognition by inverting the model using Equation 5,
where we consider the conditional moments, l of q(u˜|l) to be
encoded by neuronal activity (under the Laplace approximation
we need only encode the conditional expectation because the
conditional covariance is an analytic function of the expectation
[38]). The conditional expectation of the hidden states at the first
level encodes fast auditory input, whereas the conditional
expectation at the second level encodes slowly varying states that
engender changes in the first-level’s attractor manifold, through
the causal state that links levels.
In Figure 1A we plot the hidden states, cause and sensory
products for the synthetic bird-song generation. One can see
immediately that the two levels have different time-scales due to
their different rate constants (Equations 1 and 2). The resulting
sonogram is shown in Figure 1B. The results of the online
inversion (i.e., song perception) are shown in Figure 2A. At the first
level, the uncertainty about the states was small, as indicated by
narrow 90% confidence intervals, shown in grey. At the second-
level, the system tracks the hidden and causal states veridically.
However, as these variables are inferred through the sensory data,
the uncertainty about the hidden state reaches, intermittently, high
values. The uncertainty about the hidden states at the second-level
is very high, because these variables can only be inferred via the
causal state v(1). What would these dynamics look like if one
recorded electrophysiological data from the corresponding neuro-
nal populations? In Figure 2B, we plot simulated local field
potentials (LFP) for both levels.
To simulate the LFPs we multiplied the prediction errors by
their precision to simulate the activity of neurons encoding
prediction error: We assume here that LFPs are an expression of
prediction error, see [8] and text following Equation 5. The
prediction error of all states is relatively low, showing transient
variations that are used to adjust the conditional estimates of the
model’s states (Figure 2B). In summary, these results show that the
model can not only generate birdsong dynamics but, using the
free-energy principle, it can be used to decode incoming sensory
input with relatively high precision. Critically, at the second level,
the decoding (listening) bird infers hidden states that evolve slowly
over time. This is an important result because the values of the
states at the second level specify the attractor manifold, and
therefore the trajectory of states at the first. In other words, one
location in state space at the higher level specifies a sequence of
states at the lower. Because we have inferred or decoded the
motion of states at the second level the synthetic bird has
effectively recognised a sequence of sequences. In principle, by
adding a further level the bird could represent sequences of
sequences of sequences and so on to elaborate high-level concepts
about what is happening in the environment.
We deliberately chose to generate both levels of the birdsong
with the same (Lorenz) attractor to show it is possible to invert
generative models with temporal hierarchies comprising more
than two levels: because we were able to reconstruct the dynamics
at the second level given the first, we can argue, by induction, that
this process is repeatable to any hierarchical order, with increasing
temporal scales. This is because the dynamics at the second level
are exactly the same as the first (but evolve more slowly). Having
established that the online perception returns sensible results, we
can ask two interesting questions. First, what happens when the
sensory input violates hierarchical predictions? Second, how would
the second level express itself empirically, using LFPs and lesion
studies?
Surprising Songs
First, we simulated a surprising song, in which the last chirps
were omitted. We stopped the bird’s singing after 1.4 seconds,
which effectively removes the last two chirps (Figure 3A and 3B).
The recognition system, at the first level, correctly predicts zero
Hierarchy of Time-Scales
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amplitude auditory input, after the interruption. However, this
does not happen immediately but after a short period of about
100 ms. At the second level, the uncertainty about the cause
increases massively and maintains its trajectory, following the
expected sequence of chirps. At both levels, for a brief period after
the interruption, there is a large prediction error (Figure 3C). In
summary, the system’s response shows that both levels work
together to explain the unexpected cessation of sensory input.
While first-level dynamics suppress prediction error by fitting
sensory data, the second-level representations increase their
uncertainty.
This example was chosen to show how hierarchical models
might disclose themselves empirically. Consider the simulated LFP
responses based on prediction error in Figure 3C. The marked
responses at the premature termination of the song (red arrow) can
only be explained by a violation of predictions (surprise) over time.
This is because we have simulated an evoked response to the
omission of a stimulus. In the absence of predictions, a stimulus that is
not there cannot elicit any response. The hierarchical nature of
these predictions derives from two aspects of the model. The
dynamical hierarchy, encoded by the generalised motion within
each level, and the structural hierarchy entailed by the two-levels.
In the next simulation, we examine their relative contribution to
omission-related prediction error responses by removing the
second level. We hoped to show that the omission response was
attenuated because the prediction from the slower temporal scale
was no longer available.
A Synthetic Lesion Study
Here we simulated a synthetic bird whose second level had been
removed. In Figure 4A, we show the inversion of the ensuing
single-level model using the same data as above. The prediction
error at the first level in Figure 4C is greater than for the two-level
system (Figure 2B). This is expected because the single-level model
is not informed about the slowly changing parameter from the
second-level attractor. In other words, the two-level system attains
a lower prediction error because it can model slow environmental
dynamics, which results in a better description of sensory input.
Figure 4B shows what happens when the song stops prema-
turely. As predicted, the omission response of the single-level
system is smaller than for the two-level system and reaches zero
more quickly (Figure 4D). This means that the two-level system is
less forgiving of violations in long-term temporal structure, when
predicting sensory input. This is an important result because it
means that, given unexpected input, the two-level model produces
a larger prediction error than the simpler single-level model.
Usually, models that produce smaller prediction errors are better
than models that produce larger prediction errors. In other words,
Figure 2. Dynamic online inversion of the data presented in Figure 1. Observed data (see Figure 1) are now shown as black, dotted lines,
and the model predictions as solid, coloured lines. (A) The 90% confidence interval around the conditional means is shown in grey. The prediction
error (i.e., difference between observation and model prediction) is indicated by red dotted lines. (B) Simulated local field potentials (LFPs) caused by
the prediction error time series of both levels. See text for their simulation. Red: LFPs at first level, dark red: LFP at second level.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000209.g002
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if our task were to model interrupted birdsongs, the two-level
model is worse than the single-level model. The critical point is
that although this behaviour can be framed as a disadvantage from
a modelling perspective, it entails several advantages for the agent:
First, the larger and more enduring prediction error of the two-
level system signals that something unexpected and potentially
important has happened (a cat might have put an abrupt end to
the rendition). The second-level prediction error could then be
explained away by supraordinate causes (i.e., a nearby predator)
whose representation may be essential for survival. In short,
hierarchical systems can register and explain away surprising
violations of temporal succession, on extended time-scales.
Second, the two-level system can infer slowly changing causes to
which the single-level system is blind. These second-level dynamics
may carry useful information; for example, that the singing bird is
strong and well-fed. Missing this information may pose a serious
disadvantage when it comes to choosing a mate. Finally, the
second level adds stability to the inversion process and renders
recognition more robust to random fluctuations in the environ-
ment. The coupling of the fast to the slow level improves inference
on degraded sensory input by providing empirical priors. This is
shown in Figure 5A, where we increased the noise level of the
sensory input by an order of magnitude. The two-level model can
cope with this level of noise (although the third syllable is missed;
Figure 5A). In contrast, the single-level system fails to predict the
sensory data completely (Figure 5B). This difference in recognition
is due to veridical prior knowledge from the second level, which
confers a more enduring prediction of sensory sequences.
A key aspect of the recognition model above rests on the
nonlinearity of the internal model. It is this nonlinearity that allows
high-level states to act as control parameters to reconfigure the
motion of faster low-level states. If the equations of motion at each
level were linear in the states, each level would simply convolve its
supraordinate inputs with an impulse response function. This
precludes the induction of faster dynamics because linear
convolutions can only suppress or amplify the input frequencies;
they cannot create new frequencies. However, the environment is
nonlinear, where long-term causes may disclose themselves
through their influence on the autonomous nonlinear dynamics
of other systems. To predict the ensuing environmental trajectories
accurately, top-down effects in the agent’s internal model must be
nonlinear too.
Discussion
The simulations have shown how environmental trajectories at
two different time-scales can be extracted from fast sensory input.
This simple example of how a synthetic bird recognises songs
provides a metaphor for how the human brain might exploit
temporal structure in the environment. Obviously, the brain
affords many more levels than two and operates on much higher-
dimensional input. However, the principle of hierarchical
inference, with separation of time-scales, could be an inherent
part of neuronal computations. If the generative model employed
by the brain embodies autonomous dynamics that are coupled
nonlinearly by control parameters, each level in the hierarchy may
Figure 4. Single-level model dynamic online inversion of the data presented in Figures 1 and 3. (A) The single-level model can explain
the data (no song interruption) well. (B) The single-level model quickly approaches the zero line after an interruption at 1.4 seconds. (C) Simulated
LFPs for model inversion in (A). (D) Simulated LFPs for model inversion in (B).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000209.g004
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represent a specific time-scale. In the following, we will discuss two
bodies of neuroscientific evidence for such a mapping: (i)
modulatory backward connections which operate at slower time-
scales than forward connections and (ii) a cortical gradient of
environmental time-scales. We then relate the principle of
hierarchical inference to other theoretical accounts in neurosci-
ence.
Neuroscience Account
Modulatory backward connections. There is extensive
literature on the hierarchical organisation of the brain, in
particular of the cortex [41–44]. This organisation has been
studied most thoroughly in the visual system, where cortical areas
are regarded as forming a hierarchy; with lower areas being closer
to sensory input. The notion of a hierarchy rests upon the
distinction between forward and backward connections [41,45–
48]. This distinction is based on the specificity of the cortical layers
that are the predominant sources and origins of extrinsic
connections in the brain. Forward connections arise largely in
superficial pyramidal cells, in supra-granular layers and terminate
in spiny stellate cells of layer four or the granular layer of a higher
cortical area [41,49]. Conversely, backward connections arise
largely from deep pyramidal cells in infra-granular layers and
target cells in the infra- and supra-granular layers of lower cortical
areas. Intrinsic connections are both intra- and inter-laminar and
mediate lateral interactions between neurons that are a few
millimetres away. Due to convergence and divergence of extrinsic
forward and backward connections, low visual levels like the
primary visual cortex (V1) have small spatial receptive fields,
whereas higher visual areas have larger receptive fields; e.g.,
lateral-occipital cortex [50].
There is a key functional distinction between forward and
backward connections that renders backward connections more
nonlinear or modulatory in their effects on neuronal responses,
e.g., [48]. This is consistent with the deployment of voltage
sensitive and non-linear NMDA receptors in the supra-granular
layers that are targeted by backward connections. Typically, the
synaptic dynamics of backward connections have slower time
constants [51]. This has led to the notion that forward connections
are driving and elicit an obligatory response in higher levels,
Figure 5. Comparison of single- and two-level model inversion of high-noise birdsong data.We show only the output of each model and
the causal state of the two-level model. (A) The two-level model can explain the data relatively well, although it misses the third syllable. (B) The
single-level model is unable to predict the data at all.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000209.g005
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whereas backward connections have modulatory effects and
operate over greater spatial and temporal scales. This is crucial,
because modulatory influence, from a higher level, with slow time
constants, suggests that information from the higher level provides
contextual information to the lower level. These experimental
findings are matched by our theoretical account. In our
simulations, evidence for a slow modulatory influence on a lower
level can be observed in Figure 3A. Here, contextual top-down
influence during online inversion prevents the first-level from
reacting quickly to a surprising (unlikely) change in the sensory
input. It takes a relatively long period (100 ms) before the dynamic
inversion recognizes the unexpected end of the song. This slow
transition to a new input regime is due solely to the slow contextual
influence of the second level; the transition is much faster
(,10 ms) when one removes the contextual influence (Figure 4B).
Note that we did not tune the inversion algorithm to ensure higher
levels provide slow contextual guidance for lower levels. Rather,
the generative model of a temporal hierarchy enforces that
hierarchical separation of temporal scales.
Rostro-caudal gradient of environmental time-
scales. Assuming that the brain employs a temporal hierarchy
and that ‘wiring costs’ [52] among levels are minimised, one might
expect (i) that low levels of the cortical hierarchy are anatomically
close to primary sensory areas and (ii) that the juxtaposition of
time-scales (fast to slow) is conserved, when mapped to
hierarchically disposed cortical areas. Indeed, systems
neuroscience provides experimental evidence that there is a
rostro-caudal gradient in cortex, along which the time-scales of
representations generally increase, from fast (caudal) to slow
(rostral). In Table 1, we list brain areas/systems for which we
review the evidence that these form levels in an anatomic-temporal
hierarchy in supporting material (Text S1). The time-scales of
environmental dynamics in Table 1 are rough estimates based on
this review. In this picture, cortico-cortical long-range connections
allow for coupling among time-scales. Note that although the view
presented in this paper is entirely cortico-centric, we speculate that
a cortical anatomic-temporal hierarchy is also expressed in
subcortical structures.
Links to other theoretical accounts. The concept of
modelling sensory dynamics and their relation to neuronal
representations can be related to several approaches in
theoretical physics [53–59]. The most important is ‘synergetics’
described in Haken [56], where Jirsa and Haken [58] further
elaborated the theory to relate it to electromagnetic observations
of brain activity. Synergetics embodies the principle that fast
dynamics are ‘enslaved’ by slow dynamics, governed by a few
‘order parameters’ naturally incorporating time-scale separation.
Synergetics has been demonstrated in behavioural dynamics like
bimanual coordination, where the dynamics of finger movements
are modelled in terms of fast and slow dynamics. As shown in [59],
this framework can be used to analyze brain dynamics as
measured with magnetoencephalography. In [57], the
synergetics approach was employed to model the recognition of
behavioural patterns like arm movements. The principle of a
temporal hierarchy might also be linked to accounts of
environmental or neuronal multi-scale dynamics, e.g., [53,54].
In another related approach from theoretical physics, it has been
shown that, under certain constraints, coupled nonlinear systems
can transfer information from fast to slow time-scales [55].
There is extensive literature on the hierarchical structure of
human behaviour, see [60] for a recent example and [61,62]. In
[63], Botvinick proposed a hierarchical model of behavioural
sequences, using recurrent neural networks, where high levels in a
hierarchy encode slow time-scales, while low levels encode fast
input/output. The temporal hierarchy emerged, after learning,
without imposing specific constraints. This is an important result,
that is shared with several accounts in the robotics literature,
where a hierarchy of time-scales in recurrent networks emerges
naturally from optimizing a robot to perform navigation tasks
[21,22,64,65].
There are several theories that relate to the hypothesis that the
operations of specific brain systems pertain to temporal structure
of the environment. An exemplary approach is Fuster’s sensori-
motor hierarchy [12,66,67]. Fuster postulates that prefrontal
cortex integrates behaviour (motor) over time, while interacting
with posterior (sensory) cortical areas. This theory rests on two
interacting hierarchies (see Figures 1 and 2 in [66]). In spirit, this
model is close to what we have formulated. However, one
conceptual difference is that we regard the whole of cortex as a
single hierarchy. In our model, the unifying feature of the
hierarchy is a rostro-caudal gradient of time-scales. Fuster derives
the need for two sub-hierarchies from the division of motor and
perceptual resources. We believe that this division might prove
unnecessary because, according to the free-energy principle, the
brain has the singular task of predicting sensory input. This means
that the generators of motor output simply predict sensory
consequences of anticipated [intended] movements, e.g., [40,68].
Other models, in particular from motor control theory, try to
explain perception and action via forward modelling and
reinforcement learning, e.g., [17,69]. There are several important
differences, between these accounts and the approach used above.
Our approach uses an explicit separation of time-scales. Another
Table 1. Brain areas and systems for which we review evidence (Text S1) that cortical structure–function relationships follow a
rostro-caudal gradient.
Cortical Areas Brief Description
Time-Scale of Environmental
Dynamics
Section in
Text S1
Sensory and association cortex Sensory processing follows a temporal hierarchy Milliseconds to hundreds of milliseconds Section 1
Primary motor and premotor cortex Motor areas serve the hierarchical prediction of the
sensory consequences of movement trajectories
Tens of milliseconds to seconds Section 2
Rostral anterior cingulate cortex Hierarchical, contextual influence on action prediction Tens of seconds to much longer periods Section 3
Lateral prefrontal cortex Hierarchically ordered ‘cognitive control’ system Tens of seconds to much longer periods Section 4
Orbitofrontal cortex Representation of temporally most stable environmental
states
Very long periods Section 5
The location along this gradient determines the time-scale of the environmental dynamics that are represented.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000209.t001
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key difference lies in the generality of our inversion algorithm, with
nonlinear evolution and output functions at each level (recurrent
networks often use linear mixing of the input and a sigmoid output
nonlinearity). In addition, our algorithm enables inference on the
state precisions such that dynamic uncertainty is quantified. This is
probably important for an adaptive agent because behaviour
should not only depend on some estimated state of the
environment but also on the agent’s uncertainty about these
estimates. Other differences exist at a more technical level: we use
a variational Bayesian framework in generalised coordinates,
which enhances the stability and simplicity of the online inversion
scheme [36].
There is a large experimental and theoretical literature on
coupled neuronal dynamics, e.g., [25,26,54,70], which is distinct
from the current treatment. The neuronal dynamics considered in
this work are determined by the free-energy principle (Equation 5).
This means that any separation of temporal scales emerges
explicitly from the generative model which is transcribed from the
environment. This separation is not an inherent property of
coupled neuronal systems per se. One important implication is that
neuronal dynamics themselves may not relate directly to dynamics
of sensory input but rather to the inversion scheme used to
optimise the model of that input. However, it is interesting to note
that there are reports of a simple relationship between the
temporal aspects of sensory input and neuronal dynamics,
particularly in the auditory domain [70,71].
Conclusion
We have proposed that the brain employs a hierarchical model,
where nonlinear coupling among hierarchical levels endows each
with a distinct temporal scale. At low levels of this hierarchy; e.g.,
close to primary sensory areas, neuronal states represent the
trajectories of short-lived environmental causes. Conversely, high
levels represent the context in which lower levels unfold. Critically,
at each level, representations depend on, and interact with,
representations at other levels. We presented simulations that
provide a proof of concept that a temporal hierarchy is a natural
model to recover information about dynamic environmental
causes. In addition, we have discussed empirical findings, which
support the conclusion that cortical structure recapitulates a
hierarchy of temporal scales.
The principle of a temporal hierarchy provides a theoretical
framework for experiments in systems neuroscience. The predic-
tions based on this account could be addressed by making time-
scale an experimental factor. For visual areas, Hasson et al. [72]
provide a compelling example of such paradigms.
Supporting Information
Text S1 Review of neuroscientific evidence. In sections 1 to 5,
evidence is reviewed that cortical structure and function reflect an
anatomic-temporal hierarchy, following a rostro-caudal gradient.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000209.s001 (0.13 MB PDF)
Acknowledgments
We thank Katharina von Kriegstein for valuable discussions and her
comments on an earlier version of the manuscript. We thank Christian
Ruff, Chris Frith, Je´re´mie Mattout, Debbie Talmi, Sven Bestmann, and
Felix Blankenburg for their comments on earlier versions of the
manuscript.
Author Contributions
Conceived and designed the experiments: SJK. Performed the experi-
ments: SJK KJF. Analyzed the data: SJK KJF. Contributed reagents/
materials/analysis tools: KJF. Wrote the paper: SJK JD KJF.
References
1. Smith L, Gasser M (2005) The development of embodied cognition: six lessons
from babies. Artif Life 11: 13–29.
2. Chiel HJ, Beer RD (1997) The brain has a body: adaptive behavior emerges
from interactions of nervous system, body and environment. Trends Neurosci
20: 553–557.
3. Dunbar RI, Shultz S (2007) Evolution in the social brain. Science 317:
1344–1347.
4. Lefebvre L, Reader SM, Sol D (2004) Brains, innovations and evolution in birds
and primates. Brain Behav Evol 63: 233–246.
5. Reader SM, Laland KN (2002) Social intelligence, innovation, and enhanced
brain size in primates. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 99: 4436–4441.
6. Friston K, Kilner J, Harrison L (2006) A free energy principle for the brain.
J Physiol Paris 100: 70–87.
7. Teuber H (1960) Perception. In: Magoun HW, ed. Handbook of Physiology.
Baltimore: Waverly Press, Section I, Neurophysiology, Vol. II. pp 1595–1668.
8. Friston K (2005) A theory of cortical responses. Philos Trans R Soc B Biol Sci
360: 815–836.
9. Rao RP, Ballard DH (1999) Predictive coding in the visual cortex: a functional
interpretation of some extra-classical receptive-field effects. Nat Neurosci 2:
79–87.
10. Desmurget M, Grafton S (2000) Forward modeling allows feedback control for
fast reaching movements. Trends Cogn Sci 4: 423–431.
11. Wolpert DM, Ghahramani Z, Jordan MI (1995) An internal model for
sensorimotor integration. Science 269: 1880–1882.
12. Fuster JM (2001) The prefrontal cortex—an update: time is of the essence.
Neuron 30: 319–333.
13. Kalenscher T, Pennartz CM (2008) Is a bird in the hand worth two in the
future? The neuroeconomics of intertemporal decision-making. Prog Neurobiol
84: 284–315.
14. Poeppel D (2008) The temporal analysis of spoken language. J Acoust Soc Am
123: 3581.
15. Miller EK, Freedman DJ, Wallis JD (2002) The prefrontal cortex: categories,
concepts and cognition. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 357: 1123–1136.
16. McGurk H, MacDonald J (1976) Hearing lips and seeing voices. Nature 264:
746–748.
17. Kawato M, Samejima K (2007) Efficient reinforcement learning: computational
theories, neuroscience and robotics. Curr Opin Neurobiol 17: 205–212.
18. Morimoto J, Doya K (2001) Acquisition of stand-up behavior by a real robot
using hierarchical reinforcement learning. Rob Auton Syst 36: 37–51.
19. Haruno M, Wolpert DM, Kawato M (2003) Hierarchical MOSAIC for
movement generation. Int Congr Ser 1250: 575–590.
20. Todorov E, Jordan MI (2002) Optimal feedback control as a theory of motor
coordination. Nat Neurosci 5: 1226–1235.
21. Nolfi S (2002) Evolving robots able to self-localize in the environment: the
importance of viewing cognition as the result of processes occurring at different
time-scales. Connect Sci 14: 231–244.
22. Tani J (2003) Learning to generate articulated behavior through the bottom-up
and the top-down interaction processes. Neural Netw 16: 11–23.
23. Sprekeler H, Michaelis C, Wiskott L (2007) Slowness: an objective for spike-
timing-dependent plasticity? PLoS Comput Biol 3: e112. doi:10.1371/journal.
pcbi.0030112.
24. Wiskott L, Sejnowski TJ (2002) Slow feature analysis: unsupervised learning of
invariances. Neural Comput 14: 715–770.
25. Canolty RT, Edwards E, Dalal SS, Soltani M, Nagarajan SS, et al. (2006) High
gamma power is phase-locked to theta oscillations in human neocortex. Science
313: 1626–1628.
26. Kopell N, Ermentrout GB, Whittington MA, Traub RD (2000) Gamma
rhythms and beta rhythms have different synchronization properties. Proc Natl
Acad Sci U S A 97: 1867–1872.
27. Lakatos P, Shah AS, Knuth KH, Ulbert I, Karmos G, Schroeder CE (2005) An
oscillatory hierarchy controlling neuronal excitability and stimulus processing in
the auditory cortex. J Neurophysiol 94: 1904–1911.
28. Glaze CM, Troyer TW (2006) Temporal structure in zebra finch song:
implications for motor coding. J Neurosci 26: 991–1005.
29. Sen K, Theunissen FE, Doupe AJ (2001) Feature analysis of natural sounds in
the songbird auditory forebrain. J Neurophysiol 86: 1445–1458.
30. Vu ET, Mazurek ME, Kuo YC (1994) Identification of a forebrain motor
programming network for the learned song of zebra finches. J Neurosci 14:
6924–6934.
31. Yu AC, Margoliash D (1996) Temporal hierarchical control of singing in birds.
Science 273: 1871–1875.
32. Chater N, Manning CD (2006) Probabilistic models of language processing and
acquisition. Trends Cogn Sci 10: 335–344.
Hierarchy of Time-Scales
PLoS Computational Biology | www.ploscompbiol.org 11 November 2008 | Volume 4 | Issue 11 | e1000209
33. Poeppel D, Idsardi WJ, van W, V (2008) Speech perception at the interface of
neurobiology and linguistics. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 363:
1071–1086.
34. Laje R, Gardner TJ, Mindlin GB (2002) Neuromuscular control of vocalizations
in birdsong: a model. Phys Rev E Stat Nonlin Soft Matter Phys 65: 051921.
35. Laje R, Mindlin GB (2002) Diversity within a birdsong. Phys Rev Lett 89:
288102.
36. Friston KJ, Trujillo-Barreto N, Daunizeau J (2008) DEM: a variational
treatment of dynamic systems. Neuroimage 41: 849–885.
37. Beal MJ (2003) Variational algorithms for approximate Bayesian inference
[dissertation]. University of London.
38. Grush R (2005) Internal models and the construction of time: generalizing from
state estimation to trajectory estimation to address temporal features of
perception, including temporal illusions. J Neural Eng 2: S209–S218.
39. Ghazanfar AA, Nicolelis MA (2001) Feature article: the structure and function of
dynamic cortical and thalamic receptive fields. Cereb Cortex 11: 183–193.
40. Hatsopoulos NG, Xu Q, Amit Y (2007) Encoding of movement fragments in the
motor cortex. J Neurosci 27: 5105–5114.
41. Felleman DJ, Van Essen DC (1991) Distributed hierarchical processing in the
primate cerebral cortex. Cereb Cortex 1: 1–47.
42. Hochstein S, Ahissar M (2002) View from the top: hierarchies and reverse
hierarchies in the visual system. Neuron 36: 791–804.
43. Mesulam MM (1998) From sensation to cognition. Brain 121: 1013–1052.
44. Zeki S, Shipp S (1988) The functional logic of cortical connections. Nature 335:
311–317.
45. Angelucci A, Levitt JB, Lund JS (2002) Anatomical origins of the classical
receptive field and modulatory surround field of single neurons in macaque
visual cortical area V1. Prog Brain Res 136: 373–388.
46. Murphy PC, Sillito AM (1987) Corticofugal feedback influences the generation
of length tuning in the visual pathway. Nature 329: 727–729.
47. Rockland KS, Pandya DN (1979) Laminar origins and terminations of cortical
connections of the occipital lobe in the rhesus monkey. Brain Res 179: 3–20.
48. Sherman SM, Guillery RW (1998) On the actions that one nerve cell can have
on another: distinguishing ‘‘drivers’’ from ‘‘modulators’’. Proc Natl Acad
Sci U S A 95: 7121–7126.
49. DeFelipe J (2002) Cortical interneurons: from Cajal to 2001. Prog Brain Res
136: 215–238.
50. Wandell BA, Dumoulin SO, Brewer AA (2007) Visual field maps in human
cortex. Neuron 56: 366–383.
51. Sherman SM (2007) The thalamus is more than just a relay. Curr Opin
Neurobiol 17: 417–422.
52. Wen Q, Chklovskii DB (2005) Segregation of the brain into gray and white
matter: a design minimizing conduction delays. PLoS Comput Biol 1: e78.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.0010078.
53. Billock VA, de Guzman GC, Kelso JAS (2001) Fractal time and 1/f spectra in
dynamic images and human vision. Physica D 148: 136–146.
54. Breakspear M, Stam CJ (2005) Dynamics of a neural system with a multiscale
architecture. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 360: 1051–1074.
55. Fujimoto K, Kaneko K (2003) How fast elements can affect slow dynamics.
Physica D 180: 1–16.
56. Haken H (1983) Synergetics. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
57. Haken H, Kelso JAS, Fuchs A, Pandya AS (1990) Dynamic pattern-recognition
of coordinated biological motion. Neural Netw 3: 395–401.
58. Jirsa VK, Haken H (1996) Field theory of electromagnetic brain activity. Phys
Rev Lett 77: 960–963.
59. Jirsa VK, Fuchs A, Kelso JA (1998) Connecting cortical and behavioral
dynamics: bimanual coordination. Neural Comput 10: 2019–2045.
60. Cooper RP, Shallice T (2006) Hierarchical schemas and goals in the control of
sequential behavior. Psychol Rev 113: 887–916.
61. Badre D (2008) Cognitive control, hierarchy, and the rostro-caudal organization
of the frontal lobes. Trends Cogn Sci 12: 193–200.
62. Botvinick MM (2008) Hierarchical models of behavior and prefrontal function.
Trends Cogn Sci 12: 201–208.
63. Botvinick MM (2007) Multilevel structure in behaviour and in the brain: a model
of Fuster’s hierarchy. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 362: 1615–1626.
64. Montebelli A, Herrera C, Ziemke T (2008) On cognition as dynamical coupling:
an analysis of behavioral attractor dynamics. Adaptive Behav 16: 182–195.
65. Paine RW, Tani J (2005) How hierarchical control self-organizes in artificial
adaptive systems. Adaptive Behav 13: 211–225.
66. Fuster JM (2004) Upper processing stages of the perception-action cycle. Trends
Cogn Sci 8: 143–145.
67. Fuster JM (1990) Prefrontal cortex and the bridging of temporal gaps in the
perception-action cycle. Ann N Y Acad Sci 608: 318–329.
68. Paninski L, Fellows MR, Hatsopoulos NG, Donoghue JP (2004) Spatiotemporal
tuning of motor cortical neurons for hand position and velocity. J Neurophysiol
91: 515–532.
69. Haruno M, Kawato M (2006) Heterarchical reinforcement-learning model for
integration of multiple cortico-striatal loops: fMRI examination in stimulus-
action-reward association learning. Neural Netw 19: 1242–1254.
70. Giraud AL, Kleinschmidt A, Poeppel D, Lund TE, Frackowiak RS, et al. (2007)
Endogenous cortical rhythms determine cerebral specialization for speech
perception and production. Neuron 56: 1127–1134.
71. Luo H, Poeppel D (2007) Phase patterns of neuronal responses reliably
discriminate speech in human auditory cortex. Neuron 54: 1001–1010.
72. Hasson U, Yang E, Vallines I, Heeger DJ, Rubin N (2008) A hierarchy of
temporal receptive windows in human cortex. J Neurosci 28: 2539–2550.
Hierarchy of Time-Scales
PLoS Computational Biology | www.ploscompbiol.org 12 November 2008 | Volume 4 | Issue 11 | e1000209
